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Abstract
Cyber attackers currently benefit from an
asymmetric advantage, leveraging both features
and flaws of networking protocols and software to
discover and exploit vulnerabilities with impunity.
Although significant work has been done to automate
various cyber defenses, novel research remains in
combining autonomic reasoning and defensive cyber
deception. While many difficulties remain in creating a
robust system, we have actively explored the utility of
such systems for achieving effective cyber defense. Our
current approach applies autonomic reasoning to the
task of interfering with an attacker’s movement through
the Cyber Kill Chain R [1] by employing deceptive
countermeasures.
In this paper, we explore the
integration of autonomic computing with insights from
game theory and cognitive and behavioral psychology
to create a system for adaptive cyber defense using
deception.

1.

Introduction

Longstanding trends to create systems with
unrelenting reliability and consistency have led
to enterprise computer environments and network
topologies which are often static—retaining static
addressing and system configurations for long durations.
Today’s systems also consistently and truthfully reveal
system state and configuration status, naively informing
potential attackers of system and software version
information. The static nature and trusting naivety of
existing network environments is advantageous to an
attacker—they rely on the veracity and relevance of the
information they obtain, and can often archive it for
later successful use.
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A recent trend in network defense has been the
exploration of techniques to disrupt the information
gathering reconnaissance phase.
One method to
perform such disruption is through the use of defensive
cyber deception such as honeypots, honeynets, or
decoys [2]. Our work focuses on the use of lightweight,
low-interaction decoys due to the speed and ease at
which they can be configured and managed and the
broad class of defensive strategies which they enable.
Configuring a high-fidelity honeypot often requires a
similar amount of effort to configuring a true server.
In some cases the costs of configuring and managing
such a system may be even higher. The intricacies
of creating fake systems, traffic, and user behaviors
can be daunting. Configuring a decoy is simpler
due to the decoy only being realistic to network
scanning and initial network communications, but not
requiring its internal configuration to be realistic. The
idea of a low-interaction decoy is that its realism
is only superficial.
However, while significantly
less work is required in creating and maintaining
decoys compared to honeypots, it is still uncommon
for their configurations to be regularly changed after
deployment. Fine tuning of decoy configurations on
an ongoing basis is seen as cost prohibitive due to the
administrative burdens involved in assessing, planning,
and implementing configuration changes. As a result,
existing decoy systems tend to be a relatively static
defensive measure which limits its long term utility
against persistent or knowledgeable attackers.
Not only do our defensive systems tend to be
statically configured, but generally fail to adapt to
an attacker’s actions or adapt in ways that are easily
predicted and countered. Creating defenses capable
of automatically adapting strategies would require a
sophisticated understanding of both the system being
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adapted and the intent and actions of an attacker. It
is likely that such a system must be capable of both
implementing deceptive tactics and reasoning about an
attacker’s use of deception and counter-deception. To
this end, we investigate the use of autonomic computing
to reason about and control defensive cyber systems.
In particular, we have most recently applied these
techniques to managing an adaptive cyber deception
system [3]. By combining autonomic computing and
cyber deception, we believe we can enable a defensive
system to gain an initial defender advantage and counter
attacker actions through automated adaptation. Our
system reasons about an attacker’s actions and estimates
the attacker’s beliefs based on their interactions with
decoys deployed on a local computer network and
interspersed among, and initially indistinguishable
from, the real hosts. The intent of the overall system
is to deter, delay, or deny attacker access to the real
assets with speed and scale that would be impractical
to achieve with a human defender.

2.
2.1.

Background
Cyber Deception

Currently, best-in-class defenses automate the
configuration and deployment of technologies such as
rule-based intrusion prevention systems which automate
the blocking of malicious network communications.
Tied to the increasing sophistication of systems is a
strong desire to maintain full cognizance of system
behaviors, properties, and risks. Fortunately, system
owners and defenders exist in an information rich
environment, often with comprehensive knowledge
of system functions and defenses. However, such
knowledge is not complete.
There are gaps as
well as misconfigurations, faulty logic, and potentially
exploitable defects. It is exactly these gaps which are
leveraged by malicious actors.
It is widely acknowledged that attackers have an
asymmetric advantage against defenders who must
defend all parts of a network at all times. Fortunately,
attackers are usually working from an information
austere vantage point. Prior to interacting with a
network or system, an attacker may know very little
about its purpose, defenses, or the risks associated
with interacting with it. This knowledge asymmetry
can be exploited by cyber defenders through the use
of defensive cyber deception which adds false or
misleading information into the cyber environment,
increasing the difficulty of learning a system or
network’s true configuration, and increasing the odds of
detecting and stopping an attacker’s actions.

Cyber deception as a whole can provide an entire
class of moving target defense (MTD) strategies and
techniques which can have a significant impact on attack
success and on the overall security of a system. Prior
research has demonstrated that adaptive attackers are
more challenging to defend against [4], and likewise, our
defensive strategies must be strategically unpredictable,
rather than randomly changing. The intentional masking
of key system information can force attackers to use
heavier handed approaches — such as when a system is
configured to selectively ignore traffic unless it is from
a pre-determined and trusted source, forcing attackers
to use side-channel inference techniques to learn a
system’s port and service configuration [5]. Active
injection of false system features can lure an attacker
into attempting to exploit a seemingly easy target,
resulting in early detection and defensive response
actions. Moreover, providing an attacker with verifiable
indicators that defensive deception is being used can
act as an effective deterrent against further actions,
supporting the decision for an attacker to avoid easy
targets [6].

2.2.

Autonomics

Inspired by the human autonomic nervous system,
autonomic computing aims to address increasing
complexity in software systems [7, 8]. Autonomic
computing adopts the Monitor, Analyze, Plan,
Execute (MAPE) control-loop paradigm to enable
a set of self-sustaining properties (self-configuration,
self-optimization, self-protection, and self-healing) in
managed systems. An autonomic manager practicing
the MAPE control loop generates a knowledge base
from sensors into the system in the Monitor and
Analyze stages. Automated reasoning in the Plan and
Execute stages select adaptation strategies through
decision-making algorithms to effect change in the
system.
System changes are then fed back into
the autonomic manager through sensors in a closed
loop to ensure overall system health. Often, tuning
systems requires continuous human oversight but
self-optimizing systems are able to tune their own
parameters to maintain peak operational efficiency.
Autonomics provides an introspective view to systems
by monitoring internal system processes to identify
and address performance issues thereby enabling
self-protection and recovery.
One such autonomic manager is the The Rainbow
Autonomics Framework [9]; a research tool developed
at Carnegie Mellon University to explore autonomic
self-management of systems. The Rainbow framework
is a non-intrusive approach to adapt the behavior of
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systems through heuristic driven activation of various
actuators. Rainbow has been used in domains such as
industrial control systems [10], robot navigation [11],
naval command and control [12, 13], and network
security through DoS mitigation [14]. System architects
can build their systems with Rainbow in mind or
design de-coupled interfaces to enable self-management
after the system has been designed with minor or
often no changes to the system. Rainbow’s System
Layer defines the interfaces into the system, while
an Architecture Layer models the system and reasons
over adaptation strategies. A Translation Infrastructure
enables bidirectional communication between the two
layers. As a realization of the MAPE paradigm,
Rainbow enables self-managing properties on systems
through the following components:
• Probes are sensors into the system to collect
system properties reflecting current system state.
• Gauges receive information from probes through
the Translation Infrastructure to maintain
Rainbow’s representation of the system which
is typically expressed in the Acme formal
description language [15].
• Strategies and Tactics are established at design
time in Stitch, a language for expression of
adaptation decision trees [16].
Strategies
encompass the breadth of adaptation responses
available to the autonomic reasoning process
while tactics are used by strategies to perform a
specified action
• Closing the control-loop are Effectors which are
called by tactics to effect change in the managed
system. Effectors, like probes, are tailored to the
system and utilize the Translation Infrastructure
for communication.
System architects establish design assumptions
through architectural constraints in Acme models of the
managed system. The Architecture Evaluator detects
constraint breaches to signal the Adaptation Manager
that a response is necessary to address a fault in
the system. Latency aware adaptation considers the
delay between strategy execution and observation of
the desired effect on the system [17] which informs
the tracking of historical strategy effectiveness used in
utility calculation. Complex multi-step strategies are
achieved through decision trees where the outcome of a
step influences the selection of the next path in the tree.
Strategies reference dynamically updating Acme model
properties at every step to ensure decision-making
is performed with current knowledge of the system.

Inherent to Stitch strategies is the strategy probability
property which enables the game-theoretic concept of
mixed strategies. In Section 3.3 we describe using the
Rainbow autonomics framework to create a prototype
system for adaptive cyber defense using deception, with
strategies that leverage game theory concepts to aid in
strategy selection.

2.3.

Motivation

Game theory is used to study decision making in
situations when individuals have conflicting goals and
uncertainty concerning the other player’s motivations.
Game theoretic modeling and analysis have been
applied to an incredibly wide-ranging set of application
areas, including cyber defense, and more recently,
defensive deception. Of particular relevance to our
work are games which model imperfect information,
where the sequence of decisions made is not readily
available to all players. In cyber environments neither
defenders nor attackers have perfect information about
the environment [18]. Defensive cyber deception creates
a knowledge asymmetry in favor of the defender which
can be modeled using extensive-form games where each
player has access to only a subset of the parameters,
game history, or game structure [19].
An attacker operating with incomplete information
may incorrectly presume that a system is not vulnerable
and ignore it – the system is protected by looking
uninteresting.
Such a scenario can be modeled
by removing information from an attacker’s view of
the game environment.
Alternatively an attacker
unwittingly interacting with a decoy will likely disclose
their presence to defenders. This can be represented as
a new state in the defender’s game model representing a
detection event which is enabled by the decoys.
An attacker in a defensive deception environment is
operating with incomplete information about the actual
utility of their own moves. If the attacker is rational
and aware of deception then at worst they will expend
additional resources in disentangling real from decoy;
a benefit to the defender. If however, the attacker is
rational and unaware or boundedly rational, then the
game is likely to tip further in favor of a deceiving
defender. In game theory, purely rational players are
greedy and selfish by definition and will only choose
strategies they believe will produce the highest possible
payoff. However, if a player lies about their rationality,
or plays sub-optimally, this can lure a rational player
into taking advantage of the apparent lapse [3].
Of particular relevance to our implementation of
cyber deception game within an autonomics framework
is the use of apparently poor strategies as a lure or
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deterrent. For example, once an attacker is detected
we can interfere with their network communications in
various ways. In particular, we can slow or degrade
communications to specific machines on the network.
This technique provides the appearance of poor network
performance which can nudge an attacker into moving to
a new target—useful if the attacker’s original target was
a valuable or vulnerable system. Alternatively, when an
attacker interacts with a decoy, we might intentionally
force the connection to drop, simulating an intrusion
prevention technique and potentially indicating to the
attacker that their original target was valuable enough
to warrant such a sophisticated defense.
Normally, a rational player would never select a
sub-optimal strategy. However, observations of poor
play by the defender can affect an attacker’s perceptions
and beliefs of the rationality of the defender. A defender
who intentionally plays sub-optimally as a deception
or feint can result in defensive advantages. Cyber
deception allows a defender to fool an attacker into
taking a apparently rational greedy strategy leading the
attacker to incur unexpected detectability, deterrence, or
delay. Lastly, a deceiving defender, having pre-staged
deceptive strategies, has a more comprehensive and
more correct history of the actions taken by both
players. While both players are operating off of
incomplete information, the beliefs of the defender
are grounded in more comprehensive knowledge of
the cyber environment while the attacker’s beliefs are
tampered with and manipulated by false information
provided by the deception.
Oppositional human factors is the use of human
factors theory, technique, and practice to disrupt the
usability and utility of computing systems and networks
for malicious actors [20]. It involved using research
that has been done to make users and defenders
more effective and efficient and inverting it in order
to disrupt and impede cyber attackers. Examples
have been documented from red teaming experiments
of attentional and decision-making biases evident in
cyber attack behaviors, postulating that defenses can
be designed to specifically exacerbate these biases for
defensive gain [21]. While more research is needed to
formalize which biases can be most strongly induced in
cyber attackers and how [22], we believe that adaptive
cyber deception techniques will have significant utility
in triggering biases in cyber attackers. Our prototype
sets the groundwork for an adaptive system that can
automatically take these types of actions.
A primary goal of automation applied to
cybersecurity is to reduce the workload and monitoring
required of human operators overseeing the network.
As the complexity and scale of computer networks

increases, so does the cognitive demand, fatigue, and
stress [23] experienced by human operators conducting
cyber threat management. Other benefits of automation
include quicker reaction time to observed threats and
the exploration of new types of strategies enabled
by autonomic reasoning that cannot be achieved
through traditional manual means. However, increased
automation raises concerns over who is really in control
in the decision-making process and whether operator
situational awareness can be maintained. Therefore, it is
important to consider both sides of the human-machine
team and understand how to best utilize both teammates.
To best utilize automation in the cyber security domain,
it is important to consider several factors including:
which information processing stage automation is
applied to [24, 25], the ability to adapt to changes in the
environment [25, 26], and the level of trust placed on
the automation by human operators [27, 28].
When automating actions and responses in an
adaptive cyber deception system, it is important to
consider how the role of human operators change.
Having a human-in-the-loop at a low level of reasoning
would not enable the speed needed to effectively
react to a cyber attack. Therefore, human operators
may provide input at a more strategic level in the
decision making process. A defensive cyber deception
system may have many different strategic goals which
will lead to the selection of very different tactical
response options which drive each action selected by the
system. There are a range of strategies which include:
collection of intelligence on the attacker (the goal of
many honeypots), delaying attack progress (perhaps
until the defender’s team can complete a specific
security task such as patching a vulnerable system),
and denying access (such as preventing an attacker
from accessing specific systems which are known to
be particularly vulnerable/valuable). In our prototype,
this strategy is an operator selected goal, which allows
for human-machine teaming, and provides the system
with a subtree of response options available based on
the currently selected goal.

3.
3.1.

Adaptive Cyber Deception
Test Scenario

Our cyber scenario was inspired by the APT29 and
APT3 scenario descriptions in the MITRE ATT&CK R
framework, but focused primarily on the subsets
concerned with theft of credentials, pivoting, and data
exfiltration [29]. A successful attack in both of these
scenarios consists of leveraging an initial foothold on
the network, pivoting to a system with privileged access
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to information or additional computing resources (such
as a database); exploitation the computing resources
using the additional privileges gained via the pivot; and
exfiltration of private or confidential data.
In our scenario, we have a small network consisting
of two Windows 7 client machines and a server hosting
a database. The scripted attacker starts with a foothold
in the network, having already gained access through
a successful phishing attack, and launches automated
attacks from a Kali Linux machine. During this initial
compromise the attacker is also able to obtain a list of
potentially vulnerable Windows clients on the network.
While the test network environment is much smaller
than those commonly found in commercial enterprise
networks, it presented true to life vulnerabilities and
system configurations, running in virtual machines, to
the simulated attacker. The network and system services
are similar to those commonly found and exploited on
commercial networks.
The attacker’s goal is to move laterally through the
network after establishing persistence on one of the
Windows 7 clients, obtain credentials for the database
server, and then exfiltrate valuable data from the
database. The attacker accomplishes this by automating
both the reconnaissance and explotation steps using
the Metasploit Framework [30], Metasploit’s native
scripting engine, and custom Python code. The attacker
attempts exploitation of the Windows clients using
Metasploit’s SMB psexec exploit module [31] with a
Meterpreter reverseTCP shell payload. Exfiltration of
the database server is accomplished using FTP.
The attacker begins by choosing two clients
available on the network and attempts to exploit them
to establish persistence. The attacker needs just one
of the clients to successfully be exploited. Before
exploitation they conduct a port restricted NMAP SYN
scan to verify that targeted services are running on the
chosen clients. If they are successful in moving laterally
into a client system the attacker is able obtain the IP
address and credentials for one of the available database
servers. They will again conduct the scan to verify
service availability. If the FTP service is running they
then attempt to exfiltrate roughly five Gigabytes of data
using the credentials obtained from the Windows clients.
As a defender, we attempt to disrupt the attacker’s
forward progress and success through the use of decoys
and actions orchestrated by the autonomics framework.
Decoys are initially deployed as a mirror of existing
systems: two decoy clients and a decoy server.

3.2.

Test Conditions

The adaptive deception system was tested with two
operator set goals (delay and deny) against two control
conditions, (no decoys and static decoys). For each
conditions, each run is repeated 100 times:
• Control - No decoys are present. Rainbow is not
present.
• Static Decoys - Decoys are present, but Rainbow
is not, resulting in static decoy defense.
• Delay Goal - Adaptive decoys; adaptation
strategies are configured for delay tactics.
• Deny Goal - Adaptive decoys; adaptation
strategies are configured for deny tactics.
From the attacker’s perspective there are four outcomes:
• Success - The attacker was able to successfully
exfiltrate the database.
• Pivot failure - The attacker was unable to maintain
persistence on a real machine.
• Failure - The attacker was able to pivot, but unable
to exfiltrate the database.
• Timeout - The attacker script timed out.
In the Cyber Kill Chain R [1] , Success is an attacker
completing ‘actions on objectives‘ in stage 7, Pivot
failure is failing to complete ‘installation‘ in stage 5,
Failure is failing to reach stage 7, and Timeout indicates
they timed out during stage 7.
The delay and deny goals were selected for this
experiment as they represent aligned but not identical
desired outcomes. Categorically, we only see timeout
failures in the delay strategy as our current deny tactics
have an immediate and obvious effect on the attack
techniques used. However, while it should be clear that
imposing an increased latency or other form of delay is
not the same as kicking an attacker out of the network, a
large enough delay may result in an equivalent outcome.
Similarly, immediate denial of an attacker to a particular
network resource may delay immediate progress by
an attacker. However, such an attacker might repeat
an action at some point in the future such that the
current denial strategy is ineffective. In both conditions,
the selected strategies are implemented as a mixture
of individual technical methods (tactics, in Rainbow’s
terminology) which are selected at random according to
pre-defined probability distributions.
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3.3.

Adaptive Cyber Deception System

In this section, we detail the design and
implementation of our adaptive cyber deception
system [32]. We are using a decoy system which
is capable of deploying hundreds of lightweight
containers. These containers have unique IP and MAC
addresses and run real services, but are made much
lighter weight than Virtual Machines through the use
of shared underlying operating system components
and resources. Network packets sent to a decoy will
generate alerts, which we use as high-confidence
tripwires, as real users would not normally interact with
decoys as they do not provide useful services.
The decoy system is configured and managed via
a REST API, used to probe and enable effects on the
network using Rainbow. Using this API, we can modify
decoys, add decoys, remove decoys, increase packet
delays to decoys, decrease packet delays to decoys, and
spoof TCP reset packets to real or decoy machines on
the network to terminate an active TCP session.
We implemented the concept of guiding the
automation’s decision-making process through explicit
human-selected goals. The user can select a goal of
‘delay’ to attempt to slow down an attacker or ‘deny’ to
attempt to stop the attacker. These high level goals each
result in multiple configuration changes to Rainbow
for both likelihood of selecting a particular adaptation
response and whether a given action is considered at all.
It may be initially unclear why a cyber defender
would accept the arguably weaker goal of delay over
the apparently stronger goal of deny. One might ask
why we would ever delay an attacker rather than to
eject them from our system or networks. However, if,
as in our scenario, the attacker already has a foothold
on the network, then a deny strategy would potentially
remove them from the systems that we are currently
aware are compromised, but unfortunately, such a heavy
handed strategy both provides a strong indicator to an
attacker that their recent activities have been detected
and fails to inform the defender concerning what other
systems an attacker may already be in control of. The
attacker may still have access to the network or may
regain this access. Drastic measures may tip off the
attacker and result in destruction of important data or
access. Delaying the attacker in such situations may
enable defenders to better prepare for eventual actions
taken to remove the attacker’s access altogether. Further,
we may not be entirely confident that the actions are
representative of an actual attack. Presenting alternative
strategies might help to tease out a true attacker from a
false positive. For example, if we detect an interaction
with a decoy, increasing the delay to this system might

cause a normal user to simply stop trying to connect to it.
Alternatively, an attacker may also cease their activities
due to frustration but is much more likely to connect
to other systems based on their similarities to systems
they have already interacted with in hope of finding
one that is an amenable target. By taking the more
subtle approach of delaying traffic we can also increase
attacker cost even when they are not fully acknowledged
by defenders.
Rainbow asynchronously probes for information
about the decoy system using the REST API.
These probes provide information on decoy state and
configuration, including the services that they run,
any alerts generated through interaction with decoys,
and information concerning strategies which are being
implemented to interfere with attacker actions (such as
adding delays to network communications).
Information gathered by probes is fed to gauges
which filter the data and update Rainbow’s model of
the system. Components in the model include real
devices, decoy devices, compromised devices, and the
operator-specified goal. When alerts are generated (due
to packets sent to, or authentication attempts made on,
decoys), connectors between compromised devices and
decoy devices are made. Constraints are tied to both the
number and types of alerts.
To construct strategies for our system, we took
inspiration from recent advances in game theory,
including prior work on game theory for cyber deception
and Stackelberg games, where players interact in
a leader/follower fashion over many rounds [33].
Rainbow’s adaptation manager selects strategies based
on expected utility. This approach excels in traditional
control theory applications, but we believe may be
sub-optimal in adversarial cyber defense scenarios, as
attackers might learn how to use an autonomic system’s
reasoning against the system. Much like how defenders
want to learn of their attacker’s behavior and goals to
determine how to best counter them, attackers are able
to learn characteristics of defensive systems to gain
an advantage. Game theory provides a mechanism
for defending against attackers knowing which strategy
their opponent will use through the use of mixed
strategies, where a player makes choices based on a
probability distribution across available strategies.
We take this same approach for Rainbow strategies.
We first consider all possible branches in a strategy
for a given architectural constraint, and have a weight
assigned to each branch that contains one or more
tactics. Based on operator selected goals — delay or
deny in our example — weights are adjusted. When
a goal is selected, as in the case of deny, entirely new
tactics can be enabled or disabled by the system and
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Control
Decoys
Delay
Deny

Attacker
Successes
100
42
40
11

Pivot
Failures
0
19
23
78

Exfiltration
Failures
0
39
27
11

Timeouts
0
0
10
0

Table 1. Results of 100 runs for each condition.
Success or failure is from the attacker’s perspective.

overall parameters for the system are modified.
While our decision procedure closely matches what
one would commonly find in an extensive form game
model, in reality, the defender-attacker interaction may
extend over many rounds, including rounds where no
action is taken, rounds where unobserved actions are
taken, or rounds where multiple actions are taken by
one or both players. So, while we generally conceive
of the game structure and decision procedure using a
game theory framework and theoretical models, our
implementation does not clearly distinguish between
rounds. This represents a disconnect between theory
and practice, but has allowed for a straightforward and
scalable implementation. We are currently working to
extend the Rainbow adaptation manager and strategy
executor to more closely represent our theoretical
models which rely on reasoning over the full history of
actions for both players in a Stackelberg game [33].

4.

Results

In this section we detail the results for each 100 runs
per condition, as described in section 3.2

4.1.

Control

In the control condition, there are no decoys and
Rainbow is not present, so there are no obstacles in the
attacker’s way. As a result, all 100 runs were a success
for the attacker (see Table 1). The average successful
run time was 250.05 seconds and is indicated by the
dotted line in the following figures for comparison.

4.2.

Static Decoys

In the static decoys condition, decoys had been
pre-configured and pre-deployed, one for each real
machine in the network. As shown in Table 1, in this
condition, the attacker was only successful 42 times,
was unable to exploit and pivot 19 times, and failed to
exfiltrate the database 39 times. Pivot failures can result
from selecting only decoys to exploit, or also choosing
one decoy and one real machine, but not successfully
establishing a persistent session with the real machine
due to Metasploit failing.

Figure 1. Static Decoy results

Figure 1 shows the results for all runs. The average
success time was 261.80 seconds, slightly higher than
the control average. The average time for pivot failures
was 148.61 seconds, whereas the average time for
exfiltration failures was 268.71 seconds. The overall
average run time was 243.0 seconds.

4.3.

Delay Goal

In the delay condition, decoys had been
pre-deployed as in the static decoys condition, but the
adaptive deception system with delay as the user-defined
goal is then activated. This enabled strategies to be
selected with tactics involving: modifying a decoy,
adding a new random decoy, adding a decoy matching
the decoy that generated the alert (which would possibly
add new targets that the attacker is interested in if they
are spending time focusing on a particular decoy), and
increasing packet latency depending on the severity of
the alert.
The attacker in the delay condition was successful
40 times. Because the delay strategies ultimately do
not stop the attacker, we expect a similar success rate as
the decoy scenario without additional intervention. The
attacker had 27 exfiltration failures and 23 pivot failures,
each for similar reasons to the static decoy condition.
What is new in the delay condition is the presence of
10 timeout conditions. This is largely due to our tactic
which increases packet delays for network traffic sent to
and from decoys. Even with limited network interaction
by the attacker, we do notice benefits of this tactic. For
clarification, the timeout condition applies to database
exfiltration timeout. A ‘timeout’ for attacker-client
interaction was set to 600 seconds, 10 times the control
interaction length so the scenario would not take hours
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or days per run, but would not result in a ‘timed
out’ outcome if the attacker could still pivot from a
different client. Depending on the amount of delay
applied to decoys, even the limited interaction in this
scenario could take hours or days without a timeout.
The increased time among runs is shown in figure 2.
The average successful run was 630.23 seconds, average
pivot failure run was 817.88 seconds, average database
exfiltration failure was 637.23 seconds, average run
resulting in a timeout was 753.60 seconds, and the
overall average run time was 687.62 seconds.

Figure 2. Delay results

Although attacker success isn’t ultimately affected,
they are slowed down significantly, which was the
operator’s selected goal. This is still a defender success
over the static decoys condition as the attacker incurs
additional costs with their other interactions. In addition
to the cost of time wasted by the attacker, this could also
permit more time for a defender to maneuver, such as
adding additional defenses or deploy threat hunters to
gather intelligence. There were some cases where even
though the attacker initially triggers a delay strategy, but
where further interaction is primarily with non-decoy
hosts, resulting in limited utility in adding a delay.
Further, we did not observe much benefit to adding
additional decoys as the attacker did not enumerate the
entire network, instead relying on information obtained
from a compromised machine. If an attacker interacted
with more decoys, we would expect to see a greater
impact with these strategies.
It might be noted that an attacker with knowledge
of the delay strategy may simply modify their attacks
to be resistant to timeouts. This is fair criticism of the
strategy if judged from a denial perspective. However,
for an attacker to be free from the timeouts they must

increase the overall latency they are willing to incur.
Since this latency is under the control of the defender
and can be increased at will, this is a losing condition
for the attacker. Counter-intuitively, a better response
by an informed attacker would be instead to increase
sensitivity to timeouts and redraw a new target (without
replacement), minimizing the effect of the delay strategy
on their overall progress.

4.4.

Deny Goal

Figure 3. Deny results

In the deny condition, decoys had been pre-deployed
as in the static decoys condition, but the adaptive
deception system with deny as the user-defined goal
is then activated. This uses the strategies in the delay
condition, but with the additional tactic of sending TCP
reset packets for connections made by the attacker to
any machine. Here, we see very few successes, 11, for
the attacker, a large amount of pivot failures, 78, and 11
exfiltration failures.
The significant number of pivot failures are due
to the new tactic which can cause a TCP session
to end. Because the attacker relies on a persistent
connection for success, once they hit a decoy and
generate an alert, the tactic may be chosen to disrupt
any of the attacker’s active TCP sessions over several
minutes and disrupts their session. In a more realistic
setting, an attacker would re-exploit the machine,
but at this point, defenders may have already been
alerted to begin incident response or threat hunting
procedures, or we could have also started enabling
additional defensive capabilities, such as modifying the
network to block access. This type of TCP session
interference tactic could be risky as it could feasibly
be used by an informed attacker with the ability to
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spoof connection attempts to perform a denial of service
attack. In practice, we recommend using stronger
indicators than single packet events or network scanning
events. Triggering these more risky tactics based only
on established TCP connections can better ensure the
attacker isn’t spoofing session initiations to disrupt
legitimate users and services.
Figure 3 for the deny condition shows that the
average runtime is lower, largely due to the TCP
reset tactic interfering with the attacker’s connection
that stopped them earlier in the Cyber Kill Chain R .
The average successful run was 256.64 seconds,
average pivot failure run was 113.19 seconds, average
exfiltration failure was 302.98 seconds, and the overall
average runtime was 149.75 seconds.

5.

Conclusions and Future Work

In this work, we compare the effects of adaptive
defensive deception on an automated attacker. We
have shown how an autonomic system can be used to
perform management of a defensive deception system.
Against an automated attacker we demonstrate defender
advantage when using static decoys versus no cyber
deception. When adding in user-defined goals that
guide adaptive decoys, compared to the control scenario
with no cyber deception or static defenses we observe
an 175% increase in attacker runtime with delay goal
strategies, and a 89% reduction in successful runs with
deny goal strategies.
In this paper we described how high-level
human-selected goals such as delay and deny can
be used to direct an adaptive cyber defense system.
These goals were selected as examples of techniques
thought to be similarly effective against automated and
human attackers. However, our work encompasses
many additional defensive goals, some best attained by
deception, such as misinforming the attacker, that can
only be tested and evaluated through studies with human
attackers. There is reason to believe this where the
most powerful effects of adaptive cyber deception will
become evident; future work will examine if this is the
case. Furthermore, additional work is needed to study
the effects of adaptive cyber deception and attacker
knowledge. Our attacker model is very simplistic,
and would benefit from a more sophisticated model
which may include attacker knowledge, preference,
goal, or level of frustration. We have also only
scratched the surface in terms of modeling oppositional
human factors effects by incurring usability delays
and disruption. There are many more opportunities
to leverage cognitive and behavioral psychology to
interfere with an attacker for defensive gain. One

obvious extension to this is to incorporate a richer
library of goals and associated strategies, enabling a
human defender to direct the system’s behaviors and
adaptations in more sophisticated ways. Unsurprisingly,
we have noted in our testing that for some tactics,
the effectiveness of the defense appears to depend on
whether the attack is directly controlled by a human
or is automated. Although such automated tools are
likely to have been initiated by a human attacker, this
difference presents an opportunity to use these tactics
to determine whether the system is contending with
an automated attack or a human attacker. Feedback
of these observations could then be used to guide
adaptations which are more optimized against human or
automated attackers respectively.
Another area of interest is contending with multiple
attackers (or in some cases, determining whether the
currently observed attacker has been seen previously).
Previous work in this area has focused on forms
of passive attribution, attempting to fingerprint or
otherwise uniquely identify particular attackers through
observations made of their actions on a network
or system. The combined use of defensive cyber
deception and observation-driven adaptations provides
new avenues for exploring methods for differentiating
between attackers. Developing novel methods for
determining the mere presence of multiple attackers may
be a reasonable first step in this direction. Interestingly,
research questions to address these issues overlap but
also present unique perspectives which diverge from the
literature on attack attribution. Can we detect when
multiple attackers are present? Are the attackers aware
of one another? Are the attackers colluding or sharing
information? And this leads to new directions for
oppositional human factors research. Are there actions
we can take to disrupt teams of colluding attackers?
What about if they do not know of the presence of the
other, can we get them to disrupt each other?
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[17] G. A. Moreno, J. Cámara, D. Garlan, and B. Schmerl,
“Proactive self-adaptation under uncertainty:
a
probabilistic model checking approach,” in Proceedings
of the 2015 10th joint meeting on foundations of software
engineering, pp. 1–12, 2015.
[18] H.-M. Chou and L. Zhou, “A game theory approach
to deception strategy in computer mediated
communication,”
in Intelligence and Security
Informatics (ISI), 2012 IEEE International Conference
on, pp. 7–11, IEEE, June 2012.

[19] K. Ferguson-Walter, S. Fugate, J. Mauger, and M. Major,
“Game theory for adaptive defensive cyber deception,” in
Proceedings of the 6th Annual Symposium on Hot Topics
in the Science of Security, HotSoS, ACM, 2019.
[20] R. Gutzwiller, K. J. Ferguson-Walter, S. Fugate, and
A. Rogers, “’Oh, Look, A butterfly!’ A framework
for distracting attackers to improve cyber defense,”
in Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (HFES),
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), Oct. 2018.
[21] R. S. Gutzwiller, K. J. Ferguson-Walter, and S. J. Fugate,
“Are cyber attackers thinking fast and slow? Evidence
for cognitive biases in red teamers reveals a method
for disruption,” Proceedings of the Human Factors and
Ergonomics Society (HFES) Annual Meeting, 2019.
[22] C. Johnson, R. Gutzwiller, K. Ferguson-Walter, and
S. Fugate, “A cyber-relevant table of decision making
biases and their definitions,” ResearchGate, 2020.
[23] G. Killcrece, K.-P. Kossakowski, R. M. Ruefle, and
M. T. Zajicek, “State of the practice of computer security
incident response teams (csirts),” 2003.
[24] L. Onnasch, C. D. Wickens, H. Li, and D. Manzey,
“Human performance consequences of stages and levels
of automation: An integrated meta-analysis,” Human
Factors, vol. 56, no. 3, pp. 476–488, 2014.
[25] R. Parasuraman, T. B. Sheridan, and C. D. Wickens, “A
model for types and levels of human interaction with
automation,” IEEE Transactions on systems, man, and
cybernetics-Part A: Systems and Humans, vol. 30, no. 3,
pp. 286–297, 2000.
[26] W. B. Rouse, “Adaptive aiding for human/computer
control,” Human Factors, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 431–443,
1988.
[27] R. Parasuraman and D. H. Manzey, “Complacency
and bias in human use of automation: An attentional
integration,” Human factors, vol. 52, no. 3, pp. 381–410,
2010.
[28] B. M. Muir, “Trust in automation: Part i. theoretical
issues in the study of trust and human intervention
in automated systems,” Ergonomics, vol. 37, no. 11,
pp. 1905–1922, 1994.
[29] B. E. Strom, A. Applebaum, D. P. Miller, K. C. Nickels,
A. G. Pennington, and C. B. Thomas, “Mitre att&ck:
Design and philosophy,” Technical report, 2018.
[30] F. Holik, J. Horalek, O. Marik, S. Neradova, and
S. Zitta, “Effective penetration testing with metasploit
framework and methodologies,” in 2014 IEEE 15th
International Symposium on Computational Intelligence
and Informatics (CINTI), pp. 237–242, Nov 2014.
[31] Rapid7,
“Microsoft
Windows
Authenticated
User Code Execution.” Available online at
https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/
exploit/windows/smb/psexec.
Accessed
January 20, 2020., viewed October 2019.
[32] K. J. Ferguson-Walter and S. J. Fugate, “Adaptive cyber
deception,” US Provisional Patent Application Serial No.
62/874,805 filed July 16, 2019.
[33] X. Feng, Z. Zheng, P. Mohapatra, and D. Cansever, “A
stackelberg game and markov modeling of moving target
defense,” in International Conference on Decision and
Game Theory for Security, pp. 315–335, Springer, 2017.

Page 2007

